FISCAL FEDERALISM
Published on 18 Apr 2025
WHY IN NEWS?
Centre announced that the 16th Finance Commission would be set up by November end this year
INTRODUCTION
NEED FOR REVISING PROVISIONS
- Failure to apply
the principle of Subsidiarity (decision to be taken
at lower levels
and should be delegated upwards only if the lower levels cannot perform them)
because of the over reliance on Government of India Act
1935.
- Transition from a one-party system to a multi-party setup has changed fiscal relations between the Centre
and the state. Possibility of preference for states ruled
by the same party at the Centre
puts other states
at a disadvantage.
- Plethora of Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS) passes economic
burden to the states, especially Mahatma Gandhi
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) 2005, the Right of Children to Free
and Compulsory
Education (RTE) Act 2009, the National Food Security Act (NFSA) 2013. This is reflected
in states’ opposition to recent schemes like the PM-USHA
(scheme for higher education) scheme which also impose conditionalities for
receiving funds from the Centre.
- Asymmetrical financial powers as the Centre relies on off-budget borrowing
while
states’ borrowing limits are restricted by Article 293 (3) and the FRBM Act; Clear absence of standard budgeting rules for all tiers of govt.
- Poor financial devolution to local bodies; Lack of operational meaning
in the lists under 11th and 12th
schedule as they were directly taken from the state and concurrent
list without deeper specifications.
- Incongruence of Article 282 and the 7th Schedule.
15th FC RECOMMENDATIONS
- Vertical devolution: The share of states in
the central taxes for the period 2021-26 to be 41%, (less than the 42% share recommended by the 14th FC; The adjustment of 1% is to provide for the newly
formed union territories of Jammu and
Kashmir, and Ladakh from the centre’s resources).
- Criteria for horizontal devolution:
- Grants provided: revenue deficit
grants, sector specific grants (ex., higher education, health, aspirational
districts), state-specific grants,
grants to local bodies,
disaster risk management.
- Fiscal deficit: Centre to bring down fiscal deficit to 4% of GDP by 2025-26 and for states(i) 4% of GSDP in 2021-22(ii) 3.5% of GSDP in 2022-23 (iii) 3% of GSDP in 2023-26
- Forming a high powered inter governmental group to (i) Review FRBM act (ii) New FRBM framework for centre as well as states.
- Revenue mobilization: Income and asset-based
taxation should be strengthened. Expansion of collection at source (TDS/TCS) to reduce dependence
on income tax on salaried incomes
- » States need to streamline methodology for property
evaluation; computerized property
records should be integrated with the registration of transactions.
- GST: Resolving the inverted duty structure between
intermediate inputs and final outputs
- » Revenue neutrality of GST rate should be restored which has been compromised by multiple rate structures
and several
downward adjustments.
- » Rationalization of rate structure by merging the rates of 12% and 18%.
- Transparency in financial management:
- » Establishment of an independent Fiscal Council with
powers to assess
records from the centre as well as states.
- » A time-bound plan for phased adoption of standard-based accounting and financial reporting
for both centre and states with eventual
adoption of accrual-based
accounting.
- » The centre as well as states should not resort to off-budget financing or any other non-transparent means of financing for any expenditure. A standardized framework for reporting of contingent liabilities should be devised.
- » States’ fiscal
responsibility legislations should
be consistent with central laws, especially in defining debt; need for more avenues of short-term borrowings for states other than the ways and means advances, and overdraft facility
from the RBI.
- Health: States should increase spending on health to
more than 8% of their
budget
by 2022.
» Primary healthcare expenditure should be two-thirds of the total health expenditure by 2022.
» Flexibility in CSS in the health sector for states to adapt; shifting focus from inputs to outcome in CSS; establishment of All India
Medical and Health
Service.
Defence and internal security funding: Establishment of the Modernisation Fund for Defence and Internal Security (MFDIS), a dedicated non-lapsable fund to bridge the gap between budgetary
requirements and capital outlay allocation in defence and internal security.
- Centrally-sponsored schemes
(CSS):
Assigning a fixed threshold for annual allocation to CSS below which the
funding for a CSS should be stopped (to phase out CSS which outlived its
utility or has insignificant outlay); Third-party evaluation of all CSS within the given time frame; Funding pattern
should be fixed
upfront in a transparent manner and be kept stable.
- Miscellaneous Recommedations [ not by FC] :-
- (i) Consideration of equity as an indicator by the Finance Commission;
use of HDI as a criteria for horizontal distribution of tax devolution equity .
- (ii) Breaking
down items in 11th and 12th
schedule down into activities and
sub-activities as done by Kerala and few other states for clear demarcation of
funds and functions
CONCLUSION
Improving fiscal ties between the three tiers of government requires transparency and independence; alongwith responsible devolution of funds to the grassroot levels.