INTRODUCTION

• In the 2024 case of Association of Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India, the Supreme Court endorsed the use of Electronic voting machines (EVMs), ruling against a return to paper ballots. Additionally, the Court dismissed the proposal for 100% cross-verification of EVM votes with Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) slips, supporting the existing practice of randomly verifying 5% of VVPAT slips in Assembly constituencies.

HISTORY 

• 1977-1979

• Electronic voting idea was conceived in 1977 and a prototype developed Electronic Corporation of India Ltd, Hyderabad, in 1979

• 1980

• EC demonstrated an EVM in 1980, after consensus on its use, issued directives under Article 324 for the use of EVM

• 1982

• Machine used in 50 polling stations in North Parur seat of Kerala. The SC ruled against the legality of EVMs’ use since there was no legal amendments done to Representation of Peoples Act.

• 1988

• A section of RPA was amended to empower EC to use EVM

• 1990

• An electoral reform committee under Dinesh Goswami was set to recommends a technical examination for EVMs’

• 1998

• EVM were used by assembly election of Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, New Delhi

• 2001

• State assembly elections in Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Puducherry and West Bengal were completely conducted using EVMs

• 2004

• EVMs used in all 543 Lok Sabha constituencies

• 2013

• Amendment to The Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 introduced the use of VVPAT machines. Used in by-election for Nagaland

• 2019: 

• 1st Lok Sabha election in which EVM was fully backed by VVPAT EVM.

SUMMARY OF SUPREME COURT VERDICT

• Rejection of Pleas for 100% EVM-VVPAT Cross-Verification:

• The Supreme Court rejected the pleas for complete cross-verification of EVM data with VVPAT records, including reverting to paper ballot voting, providing VVPAT slips to voters for direct deposit into ballot boxes, and other related demands.

• Reasons for the denial of 100% cross-verification:

• It will increase the time for counting and delay declaration of results.

• The manpower required for counting would have to be doubled.

• Manual counting is prone to human errors and may lead to deliberate mischief.

• Manual intervention in counting could create multiple charges of manipulation of results.

• The data and the results did not indicate any need to increase the number of VVPAT units subjected to manual counting.

• Two Directions Issued:

• The Court issued two directions for post-election handling of Symbol Loading Units (SLUs) and checking of Burnt memory semi-controller in EVMs:

• Symbol Loading Unit (SLU) Sealing: After completing the symbol loading process, SLUs should be sealed, signed  and kept in strong rooms along with the EVMs for at least 45 days post-election results.

• Burnt Memory Semi-Controller Checking: The burnt memory semi-controller in 5% of EVMs per assembly constituency or assembly segment can be checked and verified by a team of engineers from the EVM manufacturers upon a written request from candidates. 

• The verification process, including the expenses for it, should be completed within 7 days of declaration of results. 

• If tampering is found, the candidate's expenses for the verification will be refunded.

• Suggestion for ECI:

• The bench suggested that the Election Commission of India (ECI) explore the use of an electronic machine for counting VVPAT paper slips and consider including barcodes for each party symbol.

• Additional Remarks by Justice Datta:

• Justice Datta noted that while scepticism is essential, it should not be blind, suggesting a balanced approach focused on evidence and reason to maintain the system's credibility and effectiveness.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE VVPAT

• Arbitrary Sample Size: 

• The Supreme Court's directive for a uniform sample size of "5 EVMs per Assembly Constituency" for auditing with VVPATs is criticised for not aligning with fundamental principles of statistical sampling theory.

• Limitation of Lot Acceptance Sampling: 

• The VVPAT audit involves a "lot acceptance sampling" approach, where a random sample is drawn from a defined "population" of EVMs. The entire population is either accepted or rejected based on the number of "defective EVMs," which are those where the EVM and VVPAT counts don't match.

• Lot acceptance sampling is a quality control process where a sample is taken from a batch or "lot" of products. The batch is then accepted or rejected based on whether the sample meets predefined quality standards.

• Lack of Clarity: The Supreme Court's order lacks explicit instructions in case of a mismatch between EVM and VVPAT counts. 

• Additionally, the Court did not require the Election Commission of India (ECI) to clarify these aspects or seek expert opinion for further guidance.

• Statistical Analysis of Court-Mandated Sample Size: 

• The Court-mandated sample size has a high probability of failing to detect defective EVMs. 

• Specifically, there's a 95% chance of missing a defective EVM if the sample size is based on an Assembly Constituency "population," and a 70% chance if based on a Parliamentary Constituency "population."

Recommendations to ensure robust VVPAT-based EVM audit system

• A robust audit system is crucial: 

• Rather than focusing on the various ways Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) could fail or be tampered with, the emphasis should be on developing a statistically robust audit system based on Voter Verified Paper Audit Trails (VVPATs) that can detect discrepancies with 99% to 99.9% accuracy.

• Implementing such a reliable system would ensure the integrity of the electoral process without the need for drastic measures like reverting to paper ballots or conducting 100% VVPAT verification.

• Need to achieve Golden Mean:

• The VVPAT-EVM count matching should be done at the beginning of the counting day, not at the end. This statistical sampling-based, ‘management by exception‘ approach represents the golden mean as follows:

• Where there is a perfect match, the results should be declared based on the EVM count.

• Only where there is a mismatch, manual counting of VVPAT slips for the entire ‘population’ of EVMs should be done, and the results declared based on the VVPAT count.

SUGGESTIONS TO ENSURE TRANSPARENCY AND EFFICIENCY IN ELECTION PROCESS:

• Blockchain-Based Voting Systems

• Blockchain technology offers a decentralised and immutable ledger for recording votes, which can provide enhanced security and transparency while allowing voters to verify their votes within a secure system. 

• It helps ensure tamper-proof records and promote trust in election outcomes.

• Digital Receipts with QR Codes:

• Instead of paper-based VVPATs, digital receipts with QR codes could be used. 

• After casting a vote, the voter would receive a digital receipt with a unique QR code that contains a record of their vote. 

• This QR code could be scanned to verify the vote's accuracy, while still maintaining the voter's anonymity.

• End-to-End Verifiable Voting Systems:

• It provides voters with a way to confirm their vote has been counted correctly while preserving secrecy. 

• These systems use cryptographic techniques to allow voters to verify their votes after leaving the polling booth, often through a secure website or app.

• Open-Source Software for EVMs:

• Transparency in elections can be enhanced by using open-source software for EVMs. 

• Open-source code allows for public scrutiny, enabling experts to audit the software for potential vulnerabilities or inconsistencies. Increased Voter Education and Awareness.

•  Multi-Level Audits:

• Rather than relying solely on VVPAT audits, multi-level audits can be introduced. 

• This approach involves random audits at various stages of the electoral process, from EVM manufacturing to post-election counting, allowing for a comprehensive assessment of election integrity.

• Biometric Authentication:

• Incorporating biometric authentication, like fingerprint or facial recognition, at polling stations could ensure that each voter votes only once and reduce the risk of impersonation. 

• This measure would not directly enhance transparency but could improve the overall integrity of the election process.

GLOBAL BEST PRACTICES

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CONCLUSION

Ultimately, for India's vast democracy, a robust and transparent election process is indispensable, and while alternative approaches to VVPAT can boost transparency and security, they must be carefully balanced against challenges such as technological dem

Tags:
Polity

Keywords:
EVM - VVPAT ELECTIONS DEMOCRACY