Maoist Menace
Published on 11 Aug 2024
WHY IN NEWS?
Security forces engaged in a significant operation in southern Chhattisgarh's Kanker district, resulting in the alleged killing of 29 Maoists, just days before the Lok Sabha elections. This operation marks one of the largest successes against left-wing exINTRODUCTION
Maoism: Originating in China from the teachings of Mao Zedong, Maoism emphasised armed revolution to establish a classless society, rooting itself in anti-imperialist struggle. Naxalism in India draws on Maoist principles for a similar societal transformation through armed means.
Naxalism: Originating from the 1967 Naxalbari uprising in West Bengal, Naxalism emerged as a peasant revolt against landowners due to persisting economic discontent post-independence. Stemming from a split within the Communist Party of India (Marxist), it embraced Maoist ideology, initially concentrated in West Bengal but later expanding to rural areas across central and eastern India through groups like the Communist Party of India (Maoist).
Red Corridor: The Naxalites are primarily located in the "Red Corridor," spanning from West Bengal to Karnataka. Most violence occurs in states like Chhattisgarh, West Bengal, and Odisha. This region, characterised by dense forests and limited infrastructure, enables Naxalite control and shields them from government surveillance.
Origin: Established in 1925, CPI aimed at leading a proletarian-led revolution against British rule.Drawn from disillusioned members of Mahatma Gandhi's non-cooperation movement, CPI found inspiration in global communist movements and the success of the October Revolution in Russia.
Telangana Movement: Telangana movement (1946-1951) was aimed at land redistribution and liberation of peasants.CPI's presence in Telangana led to promotion of guerrilla warfare, but faced military crackdowns by the Indian Army.
Withdrawal: I ndian Army's offensive forced CPI to choose between surrender and continued armed struggle. CPI's leadership was divided, leading to negotiations with Indian National Congress (INC) and formal withdrawal from insurgency in October 1951.
Origin: Ideological rifts started in the CPI regarding the party’s approach to the Constitution, the Capital class, Nehru and his socialism. One section led by S.A.Dange favoured the INC since the ties with USSR were improving, but a leftist faction having seen the imposition of president's rule and throwing out of the first communist ruled state in India shied away.
The global rift between Russian and Chinese communism and the Sino-India border war ultimately led to formation of CPI-M led B.K.Ranadive and A.K.Gopalan..
Ideology: CPI-M emerged advocating for a more revolutionary approach, siding with Chinese Maoist ideology over Soviet influence.
Conflicts:
In 1965, during the India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir, CPI-M faced a dilemma as Mao's China supported Pakistan. This challenged the party's loyalty to Chinese communist ideology, leading to internal discontent and accusations of betrayal.
The left parties won the 1967 West Bengal elections dislodging the INC. However, the internal ideological issues persisted.
An impatient extreme leftist faction of party workers, who later called themselves the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC), emboldened by the fact that now they have a communist government, started to seize paddy lands from rich landlords (jotedars) in their Naxalbari strongholds with some santhal tribals .
The issue led to the death of a police officer and retaliatory killings of tribals. The left government could not support such lawlessness and aided the central government in curbing the movement.
Origin: The Naxalbari incident had been brought under control with the arrest of leaders like Jangal Santhal and going underground of Charu Mazumdar. They were expelled by the CPI-M.
In 1969, they officially split from the CPI-M by forming the Communist Party of India- Marxist Leninist (CPI-ML).
Ideology: Mazumdar's CPI-ML, despite its name, leaned heavily towards Maoist ideology, evident in its slogan: “China’s Chairman is our Chairman. The Chinese path is our path.” However, after India’s defeat in the Sino-Indian War of 1962, promoting Maoist propaganda clashed with patriotic sentiments, making it unpopular.
Operation Steeplechase: In 1971, this operation marked a turning point as the government deployed the army and CRPF into West Bengal, lasting 45 days and effectively crushing the Naxalite movement. This led to a decline in activity for the next two decades.
Split: It later splits into various naxalite groups, including CPI (Marxist-Leninist) People's War or People’s War Group (PWG) and Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI).
1980s-1990s: Both CPI (Marxist-Leninist) People's War and Maoist Communist Centre of India carry out armed struggles in various parts of India, primarily in rural areas with significant tribal populations and socio-economic disparities. They aim to overthrow the Indian state through armed revolution.
2004: PWG and MCCI with other splinter groups merged forming the Communist Party of India-Maoists. This merger strengthens the Maoist movement in India and consolidates their efforts towards a unified revolutionary front.
The Modern Maoists: The CPI (Maoist) continues its armed struggle against the Indian government, primarily in regions known as the "Red Corridor," which includes parts of Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Jharkhand, Bihar, and Maharashtra. They engage in guerrilla warfare tactics and aim to establish a "people's democratic state" through the overthrow of the Indian state.
Historical Injustices: Historically, India has had deep-rooted socio-economic disparities, particularly in rural areas. These disparities, often along caste and class lines, have led to marginalisation and exploitation of certain communities, creating fertile ground for radical ideologies like Maoism to take root and spread.
Socio economic neglect: Neglect in rural areas, particularly among Dalits and Adivasis, fuels resentment and support for the Naxalite movement. Exploitation by local elites, limited access to resources, and political marginalisation exacerbate their grievances.
Poor governance: Delayed and inefficient implementation of welfare schemes, contribute significantly to the proliferation of Naxalism whereas Naxalites effectively recruit new members, particularly unemployed youths in rural areas, by offering monthly salaries and uniforms, thereby capitalising on economic vulnerabilities and discontent among the youth.
Lack of opportunities: The scarcity of educational opportunities in rural areas stifles the aspirations of youth for better livelihoods. Inadequate schooling infrastructure and quality education perpetuates the cycle of underdevelopment.
Collaboration of villagers: Insurgency in Maoist-affected areas thrives due to villagers' active involvement, coerced or influenced by Maoists, engaging in intelligence gathering and combat. This collaboration endures through Maoist indoctrination and governance gaps, fueling insurgency growth.
Security operations:
Counter Terrorism and Jungle Warfare (CTJW) College: Established in 2004 in Kanker, the CTJW College provided essential training in guerrilla warfare for security personnel.Training was made mandatory for local police, CRPF, superintendents of police, and collectors.
Salwa Judum: It was established in 2005 as a state-sponsored militia in Chhattisgarh, India to counter the Naxalites, a far-left Maoist movement. The militia was made up of local tribal youth who received support and training from the state government. In 2011 it was banned by the Supreme Court of India for its human rights and other violations.
Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (CoBRA): Formed in 2008, CoBRA is a specialised unit of the CRPF, trained in guerrilla tactics and jungle warfare.
Security Related Expenditure (SRE): Under SRE Scheme funds are provided to LWE affected states for capacity building of the States through provisions of ex-gratia to the family of civilian/security forces killed in LWE violence, training and operational needs of security forces, rehabilitation of surrendered LWE cadre, community policing, compensation to security force personnel/civilians for property damage by left wing extremists, etc.
Policy measures:
Ban under UAPA: On June 22, 2009, the Government of India banned the Communist Party of India (Maoist) by invoking Section 41 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, branding it as a terrorist organisation.
National Policy and Action Plan: In 2015, the NDA government had adopted the ‘National Policy and Action Plan’, which aimed at addressing Left Wing Extremism (LWE) in the country.
In 2017, the SAMADHAN doctrine was developed by the Government of India to combat left-wing extremism (LWE).
Naxal Surrender Policy: It offers rehabilitation and support to former insurgents who renounce violence and wish to reintegrate into society. It includes provisions for skill development, financial assistance, and other incentives to encourage surrender.
Example: The Naxal surrender policy led to a significant decrease in Odisha cadre recruitment, estimated at 10% of the Maoist strength. In 2014, Nachika Linga, a prominent leader surrendered along with many local Maoists.
Three pronged strategy:The 'Vishwas-Vikas-Suraksha' strategy aims to build trust, foster development, and enhance security in Chhattisgarh. Through proactive development initiatives, the government seeks to win the confidence of locals and address underlying grievances.
Special schemes:
State security initiatives:
Various states have formed dedicated security teams like the specialised C-60 force of Maharashtra.
Chhattisgarh recently formed a State Investigation Agency (SIA) to coordinate with NIA to handle cases related to terrorism, Naxalism, and leftist extremism efficiently.
Capacity building:
Educational facilities:
Ekalavya Schools: As many as 234 Eklavya Model Residential Schools (EMRS) have been sanctioned for areas affected by Left-Wing Extremism, of which 119 are functional.
PortaCabin Schools: This initiative offers free education to tribal children in remote Naxal areas of Chattisgarh since 2012, with portable schools accommodating 500-600 children each, facilitating easy relocation in emergencies.
Training Programme:
CIIIT: Maharashtra government and Tata Technology Limited, started the Centre for Invention, Innovation, Incubation, and Training (CIIIT) to boost skill development and industry-based training in Gadchiroli, a Naxal-affected district.
Roshni scheme: Launched in 2013, this initiative targets 50,000 youth in 24 Naxal-affected districts over three years, with 50% women beneficiaries, funded jointly by Union and State Governments and works in a public-private partnership.
Tribal Development:
Pariyana Coaching: Chhattisgarh government launches free coaching institute in Narayanpur district, aiding tribal students aspiring for medical and engineering careers in Maoist-affected Abujhmad forest, in collaboration with local educators and administration.
Nangat Pila Project: Kondagaon, a Naxal-hit district in Chhattisgarh, sees a 40% drop in malnourished children over two years due to this project, while also boosting livelihoods for women and self-help groups.
Affects normal life: Navigating daily life in Maoist-affected regions presents numerous challenges, from compromised security to restricted opportunities, hindering the socio-economic development and well-being of local communities.
Example: Sainath Chaitu Naroti, a 26-year-old tribal youth, was fatally shot by Naxals recently in Maharashtra, for pursuing police recruitment.
Lack of connectivity: Connectivity is crucial for enhancing communication, security, and development in Maoist-affected regions.
Example: Until now, only about 30% of Abujhmad in Chhattisgarh has had mobile connectivity. The first mobile tower was erected in Abujhmad in 2011, and since then, only nine more have been installed.
Displacement: Internal displacement of people is a pressing concern in regions affected by conflict and insurgency.
Example: By 2024, more than 6,200 Murias had relocated to 54 settlements, termed as Internally Displaced People (IDP) settlements, in Andhra Pradesh's Godavari region, fleeing from the Dandakaranya region.
Ramachandrapuram was established by 40 families of the Gutti Koya tribe escaping conflict in Naxal-hit Chhattisgarh during the 2005-11 Salwa Judum-Naxalites clashes.
Multiple Agencies: Different agencies like CRPF, COBRA, Chhattisgarh Police, and DRG add complexity to anti insurgency operations.
Example: The District Reserve Group (DRG) is composed of former Special Police Officers of Salwa Judum, surrendered Maoists, and local tribal youth.DRGs undergo distinct training, causing coordination challenges.This may hinder cohesive operations in face-to-face encounters with Maoists.
Deceptive Tactics: Maoists demonstrate strategic sophistication, countering security forces with empty target areas and ambushes, indicating awareness of surveillance and tactical manoeuvring.
Mental health: Paramilitary forces stationed in remote camps far from homes. Limited leave periods, combined with lengthy travel times, result in minimal time spent with family, impacting morale and mental well-being leading to suicides
Example: Since 2018, there have been around 30 cases of suicide or fratricide in the paramilitary forces.
Operational Secrecy Issues: Maintaining secrecy in large-scale operations becomes increasingly difficult due to logistical movements, communication among personnel, and the use of drones, which can be detected by Maoists, compromising the element of surprise.
Inter-Agency Distrust: Instances like the Burkapal ambush(2017) and Palodi IED blast(2018) have deepened distrust between paramilitary forces and state police, exacerbated by conflicting chains of command and rank disparities, hindering effective coordination and operations.
Example: In June 2020, two Chhattisgarh Police jawans were caught selling ammunition to Maoists, revealing a trust deficit within the security forces and raising concerns about the reliability of former Maoist informants.
Fake encounters: Amid the government's efforts, accusations of fake encounters have emerged from human rights activists and families of alleged Maoist victims.
Example: In February, wives of three deceased men, accompanied by locals, protested at a police station in Kanker, alleging innocence of the slain individuals.
Improve network connectivity: Mobile towers in remote areas aim to connect the native population to essential services like education and healthcare, countering the Maoists' strategy of keeping them isolated and uninformed.
Effective Dialogue: The central government should engage in sincere dialogue with the Naxalites and state leaders to address grievances and offer pathways to mainstream participation, as evidenced by the significant reduction in violence observed during ceasefire and dialogue initiatives in regions like Andhra Pradesh in 2004.
Holistic Assessments: There is a need for holistic analysis beyond mere statistics to gauge the trajectory of Maoism. Parameters such as recruitment trends, senior member surrenders, and military capabilities are vital for a nuanced understanding of Maoist activity.
Infrastructure Development : Investing in road construction,schools, health centres, and providing electricity, is essential in Maoist-controlled areas which will provide access to information and alternative perspectives.
Dual strategy: Government efforts should persist with a dual strategy of development and direct action, emphasising enhancements in healthcare and education to curb Maoist influence and build trust among villagers.
Proper policing: Ruthlessness and aggression should be directed towards higher-ranking Naxal leaders, not low-level cadres or sympathisers. Security forces must refrain from misconduct with villagers, particularly women, and avoid any human rights violations.
CONCLUSION
In summary, countering the Maoist insurgency demands a comprehensive strategy blending development projects with robust security measures. Strengthening infrastructure, expanding connectivity, and prioritising education and healthcare are pivotal for winn