INTRODUCTION

• Over the past three years (2019-2022), there has been a significant increase in militant activities in the Jammu region, resulting in 40% of security personnel casualties. This shift suggests that the focal point of these incidents has moved from the Kashmir Valley to the Jammu division.

RECENT INCIDENTS

The resurgence of militant activity has primarily centred around two areas:

1. Chenab Valley:

• Includes the districts of Doda, Kishtwar, Ramban, Kathua, Udhampur, and Reasi.

2. South of Pir Panjal:

• Covers Rajouri and Poonch districts.

TERROR INCIDENTS

• Since 2021:

• Jammu region has witnessed 31 terror incidents.

• Resulted in the deaths of 47 security personnel and 19 civilians.

• In 2021:

• At least 51 security personnel were killed in various incidents across districts like Poonch, Rajouri, Kathua, Reasi, Doda, and Udhampur.

• In 2022 and 2023:

• Jammu experienced six attacks.

• Resulted in the deaths of 12 security personnel.

• In 2024

• Five Indian Army personnel were killed on July 8 after terrorists ambushed an Army convoy in Badnota village, which is 124 km from Kathua town in Jammu.

• On June 9, terrorists attacked a bus in Reasi district killing nine pilgrims and leaving 33 injured, the day Prime Minister Narendra Modi was being sworn in for a third term in office.

• Comparison with Kashmir Valley:

• Kashmir Valley reported 263 terror incidents during the same period.

• Led to the loss of 68 security forces and 75 civilians.

REASONS

• Reduction in Security Grid:

• After the 2020 Galwan clashes in eastern Ladakh, a significant portion of the Army was redeployed to the China border.

• This redeployment thinned the security grid in Jammu, leaving certain areas vulnerable.

• Infiltration from Pakistan:

• An estimated 20-25 hardened militants have infiltrated from Pakistan.

• They operate around 40-50 km from the border, with active groups in the Poonch-Rajouri and Kathua-Doda-Basantgarh regions.

• Gap in ground level intelligence:

• Lack of ground-level intelligence and motivated terrorists with sophisticated planning are major challenges.

• Foreign terrorists predominantly carry out attacks using Kathua and Samba for infiltration, exploiting dense forest cover.

• This gap has made it harder to track and preempt militant activities.

• China Factor:

• The incidents at Line of Actual control with China (Depsang 2013, Galwan 2020) has made the Indian force shift some personnel to that border. This reduced its strength at the Pakistan border. 

• Trust issues with local population:

• The mishandling of security operations has diminished trust between locals and the state. 

• Instances where civilians are caught in conflicts or experience human rights abuses weaken cooperation and breed resentment. 

• Technological Advancements:

• Terrorist groups have adapted to modern technology, using encrypted communication channels, social media, and other digital tools to coordinate and spread propaganda.

• Increased instances of narco-terrorism using drones to transport drugs, explosives, weapons, and money.

• Sophisticated equipment like night-vision glasses and M4 rifles are being used by militants.

• The use of YSMS technology, which is hard to trace and detect, and SIM-less phone activation, where militants activate Bluetooth technology to connect with another group and across the Line of Control (LoC), has made it hard for the security forces to develop virtual intelligence

• Shift from foreign to local militants:

• There has been a transition from foreign to local militants taking a more prominent role in insurgency activities, aiming to portray the movement as domestically driven amidst increasing international pressure on Pakistan. 

• This shift towards "homegrown" militancy complicates counterterrorism efforts and necessitates a nuanced approach.

• Geographical factors:

• The geographical proximity to the Line of Control (LoC) allows militants easier access from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, aiding infiltration and logistics.

•  Recent incidents suggest a deliberate strategy to establish strongholds in mountainous and forested areas across districts such as Rajouri, Poonch, and Reasi.

Rajouri-Poonch area - NEW CENTRE FOR TERRORIST ATTACK (GURU prasad BOX)

Terrorist groups are increasingly focusing on the Rajouri-Poonch area in Jammu and Kashmir for several strategic reasons:

1. Proximity to the Line of Control (LoC): Rajouri and Poonch districts are located close to the Line of Control, making it easier for militants to infiltrate from across the border in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. 

1. The rugged terrain and dense forests provide natural cover, facilitating their movements and operations.

2. Historical Significance: These regions have witnessed sporadic insurgent activities in the past, and militants often exploit local vulnerabilities and historical ties to establish networks and operational bases.

3. Strategic Importance: Militants perceive Rajouri and Poonch as strategically important due to their geographic location. 

1. These areas serve as potential launchpads for cross-border attacks into other parts of Jammu and Kashmir, as well as India.

4. Security Dynamics: The redeployment of Indian security forces to other areas, such as the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China after the Galwan clashes, has created a security vacuum in some parts of Jammu and Kashmir. 

1. This redeployment may have temporarily reduced the intensity of security presence in Rajouri-Poonch, allowing militants to exploit gaps in security arrangements.

5. Tactical Advantage: Militants often target areas where they can garner media attention or create psychological impact. 

1. Rajouri-Poonch, being relatively less fortified compared to other heavily militarised zones, may present softer targets for their operations.

6. Local Support Networks: Over the years, militants have developed local support networks in these regions, including sympathisers and facilitators who provide logistical and intelligence support, aiding their operations and evasion from security forces.

WAY FORWARD

• Enhanced Intelligence Gathering:

• Prioritise development of human intelligence networks to gather actionable information.

• Strengthen ground-level intelligence capabilities through increased training and resources.

• Reevaluate Deployment Strategies:

• Review troop deployments to ensure adequate coverage and response times across vulnerable areas.

• Consider redeployment or reinforcement of forces based on current threat assessments and operational needs.

• Technological Integration:

• Enhance integration of technology for surveillance and intelligence gathering, while ensuring it complements rather than replaces human intelligence.

• Invest in advanced equipment and technologies to bolster operational capabilities and response effectiveness.

• Interagency Coordination:

• Improve coordination between security agencies, including police, military, and intelligence services, to enhance information sharing and joint operational planning.

• Foster collaboration with local communities to enhance trust and cooperation in counter-terrorism efforts.

• Capacity Building and Training:

• Conduct regular training exercises to maintain operational readiness and proficiency in handling diverse security challenges.

• Provide specialised training in counter-terrorism tactics, including urban warfare and handling sophisticated militant tactics.

• Community Engagement and Development:

• Implement community-oriented programs to address socio-economic grievances and reduce local support for militant activities.

• Promote initiatives that empower local communities to participate actively in maintaining security and reporting suspicious activities.

• Legal and Policy Frameworks:

• Review and strengthen legal frameworks to facilitate effective prosecution of militants and collaborators.

• Ensure policies support both security measures and respect for human rights, fostering a balanced approach in counter-insurgency operations.

• Regional and International Cooperation:

• Strengthen cooperation with neighbouring countries, particularly Pakistan, to address cross-border infiltration and militant activities.

• Engage with international partners to enhance capacity building, intelligence sharing, and strategic coordination in combating terrorism.

STEPS TAKEN BY GOVERNMENT

• Enhanced Security Measures: 

• Security forces have intensified proactive operations against terrorists. These operations involve targeted strikes, raids, and neutralisation of terror modules.

• Increased night patrolling and stringent checking at security checkpoints help prevent infiltration and monitor suspicious activities.

• Intelligence Coordination and Vigilance: 

• Various intelligence agencies collaborate to share crucial information about terrorist activities, sleeper cells, and infiltration attempts.

• Security forces maintain a high level of alertness to respond swiftly to emerging threats.

• Zero Tolerance Policy: 

• The Indian government has adopted a zero-tolerance policy toward terrorism. This includes strict enforcement of laws against anti-national elements.

• Use of Anti-Terror Laws: Authorities invoke the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act and other relevant laws to conduct raids, detain suspects, and prevent terrorist activities.

• Panchayat-Level Youth Clubs

• Engage youth in development and recreation to reduce militancy.

• Village Defence Guards 

• Formerly known as Village Defence Committees are a civilian militia first established in the mid-1990s Jammu and Kashmir for the self-defence of locals in remote hilly villages against militancy. 

• It consists of villagers as well as police officers.

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    SHORT TAKES

    Line of Control (LoC) 

  • It is the military control line that separates the Indian-administered and Pakistani-administered parts of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. 

  • The LoC stretches approximately 740 kilometres (460 miles) across the region, from the northernmost point near the Siachen Glacier to the southernmost point in Jammu.

  • The Karachi Agreement, signed in July 1949, following the first India Pakistan war (1947-48) formalised the Cease Fire Line (CFL) between Indian and Pakistan forces that had been in place since January 1st of that year.

  • The intention was for the CFL to be a temporary measure until a plebiscite could be held to determine the future of Kashmir. However, disagreements over demilitarisation prevented the plebiscite from happening, and the CFL essentially became a more permanent dividing line.

  • Following the 1971 war, the Simla Agreement of 1972 established the Line of Control (LOC) which replaced the CFL. 

  • However, the Agreement doesn't define it as a permanent border. It aimed to maintain peace and recognized the de facto control of each side. LOC reflects their current control, not a legal resolution.

  • The LOC is a de facto line of control, not a legally recognized border. The status of Kashmir remains unresolved under international law

CONCLUSION

The resurgence of militancy in Jammu demands a multifaceted approach, combining robust security measures with community outreach and socio-economic development, as the evolving security landscape shifts focus from the Valley to Jammu. Authorities must add

Tags:
Polity

Keywords:
Militancy Jammu & Kashmir Internal Security